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In his book Misbehaving: The Making of 
Behavioral Economics, Richard Thaler writes 
about “Supposedly Irrelevant Factors” (SIFs), 
or factors that observably affect economic deci-
sions but are neglected by neoclassical mod-
els of consumer behavior (Thaler 2015). In 
this article, we highlight an important SIF that 
is neglected not only by neoclassical models, 
but also by now-standard behavioral econom-
ics models like the beta-delta model of time 
discounting (Laibson 1997). That SIF is a 
“personal plan.”
For example, consider someone who has the 
opportunity to engage in a preventive health 
action, such as obtaining a flu shot or a cancer 
screening. If she has beta-delta preferences, she 
may fail to take the action because it entails 
up-front costs (inconvenience and discomfort) 
and delayed benefits (improved future health), 
even though she may deem the action to be in her 
overall best interest when she judges it before 
the opportunity for action arises. According to 
the beta-delta model, techniques for increasing 
the likelihood that this individual will take the 
preventive health measure include reducing the 
up-front costs or offering her a commitment 
device. Recent field studies, however, have 
documented the success of another technique. 
Simply prompting people to form concrete 
plans of action regarding when, where, and how 
they will implement their intentions produces 
improvements in follow-through, even when 
such prompts do not alter the costs and bene-
fits of the action or change the opportunities for 
using commitment strategies (Milkman et al. 
2011, 2013).
People make personal plans frequently (e.g., 
they write “to do” lists, keep calendars, and set 
deadlines). Many popular books, like Getting 
Things Done: The Art of Stress-Free Productivity, 
are devoted to the topic (Allen 2002). However, 
personal plans for future actions play a limited 
role in traditional economic analyses of indi-
vidual decision making. Neoclassical models 
typically treat a personal plan as nothing more 
than an agent’s (correct) understanding of the 
actions she will take in every possible future 
contingency.
Plans become more interesting when agents’ 
actions deviate in predictable ways from those 
plans (see Milkman, Rogers, and Bazerman 
2008 for one review), for example as a conse-
quence of beta-delta intertemporal discount 
functions (Laibson 1997) or the conflicting pref-
erences of “multiple selves” (Thaler and Shefrin 
1981). If an analyst were looking for the object 
in these models that most closely resembles a 
personal plan, she might point to the agent’s 
most preferred complete contingent future 
course of action. Alternatively, she might point 
to the agent’s beliefs about the course of action 
the agent will take, regardless of the accuracy 
of those beliefs (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999).
In this article, we adopt a third perspective 
that emphasizes how personal plans can play a 
more direct role in influencing behavior, and not 
only to overcome self-control problems: the sim-
ple act of planning to take an action can increase 
the likelihood of taking that action. An individ-
ual may not form a concrete plan in the first 
place. If the individual does form a plan, it may 
correspond neither to preferred future actions 
nor to beliefs about future actions because, for 
example, such a plan allows her to implement a 
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personal management strategy that counteracts 
limited attention. An individual may also form 
a plan for less sophisticated reasons, and such a 
plan may become self-fulfilling. For example, a 
person who arbitrarily plans to order chicken at a 
restaurant (perhaps because she recently saw an 
advertisement for chicken) may be more likely 
to end up choosing chicken over fish because the 
plan creates a reference point from which she 
is reluctant to deviate (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979; Ko˝szegi and Rabin 2006).
We are not the first to take up personal plans 
as the subject of economic inquiry, but we wish 
to highlight the important yet underappreciated 
role of plans in driving economic outcomes. We 
organize our discussion by considering three 
questions. First, what are the effects of plans 
on behavior? Second, when are plans formed? 
Third, how do plans deviate from optimality? 
For each of these questions, we (i) offer a brief 
overview of existing research that sheds light on 
the issue and (ii) identify gaps in current knowl-
edge. We emphasize connections to the growing 
theoretical literature that gives personal plans 
a substantive role, but we conclude that more 
research is needed, especially on the latter two 
questions we cover.
I. What Do Plans Do?
We discuss three ways in which plans affect 
behavior.
First, planning helps us overcome barriers to 
following through on our intentions. The plan-
ning prompts mentioned above have been shown 
to improve follow-through in domains ranging 
from voting (Nickerson and Rogers 2010) to 
obtaining flu shots (Milkman et al. 2011). One 
barrier to follow-through that planning prompts 
help people overcome is the failure to attend to 
logistics (e.g., arranging childcare in order to 
visit the doctor). Contemplating logistical hur-
dles in advance makes it easier to develop strate-
gies for working around them. Another barrier to 
follow-through that planning prompts help peo-
ple address is forgetfulness. Encouraging peo-
ple to articulate a plan embeds intentions more 
firmly in memory by prompting deeper process-
ing and attention. Planning prompts also asso-
ciate cues like the intended execution time with 
the need to act. In line with this reasoning, plan-
ning prompts are particularly effective among 
 populations at higher risk for  forgetfulness, 
such as the elderly and parents (Milkman et al. 
2013).1
Second, plans create goals or personal rules 
with the purpose of helping people follow 
through on their intentions. A large literature 
demonstrates that setting a challenging, yet 
attainable, explicit goal increases achieve-
ment, even in the absence of external incentives (Locke and Latham 1990). One force at play is 
people’s strong desire to be internally consistent 
and thus to avoid breaking explicit commit-
ments (Festinger 1962). In addition, people may 
be reluctant to fall short of goals, which could 
become reference points, because of loss aver-
sion (Heath, Larrick, and Wu 1999).2,3
Third, plans influence behavior because they 
frame decisions even when they are not formed 
with the objective of increasing follow-through. 
To take an example, models of expecta-
tions-based reference dependence predict a 
stronger taste for buying insurance when the 
opportunity to buy is anticipated—and a plan to 
buy is made—than when it is not, since expected 
premium payments are then not coded as a loss (Ko˝szegi and Rabin 2006, 2007).4
II. When Do People Form Plans?
The research described in the previous sec-
tion highlights the effects of plans on behavior, 
1 Models of “thinking ahead” in economics include 
Bolton and Faure-Grimaud (2009). 
2 Models of personal rules in economics include Bénabou 
and Tirole (2004) and Hsiaw (2013). 
3 One particularly interesting class of personal rules 
has been dubbed “mental accounting.” Mental accounting 
describes the tendency to treat time and money as if they 
are not fungible but instead belong to distinct accounts that 
can only be used for a predetermined purpose or during a 
predetermined time interval (Thaler 1985). By creating 
mental budget limits (e.g., “I will only spend $3,000 on lei-
sure travel this year”), people may be able to overcome the 
impulse to splurge on temptations. 
4 Plans also matter in models where the choice context 
influences how attributes of different options are weighed 
(Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2013; Ko˝szegi and Szeidl 
2013; Bushong, Rabin, and Schwartzstein 2015) because 
this context can be shaped by the timing of when an agent 
forms her plan. For example, in the Bushong et al. model 
of relative thinking, a worker is less willing to put in effort 
for a fixed return in an environment where she expected to 
earn more at the time of making her plan, since this makes 
the return feel small. The model suggests that she would be 
more inclined to put in effort if, prior to making a plan, she 
received a more precise signal about returns. 
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but it largely leaves open the question of when 
people form plans. People do not update their 
plans continuously. One model is that individ-
uals update their plans at regular intervals on 
a fixed schedule (Gabaix and Laibson 2002). 
Another is that individuals incur cognitive costs 
from planning and choose when to plan by trad-
ing off those cognitive costs against the benefits 
of optimizing their decisions (Reis 2006). Both 
models likely contain some truth, but research in 
psychology indicates that planning takes place 
on a more nuanced schedule.
Research on the “fresh start effect” has 
shown that people are more likely to engage in 
self-controlled acts, such as planning, at the start 
of new cycles like the beginning of the week, 
month, or year and following holidays and birth-
days. People search more for the term “diet” on 
Google and create personal goals at a higher rate 
following these fresh start dates (Dai, Milkman, 
and Riis 2014). At the start of a new cycle, peo-
ple perceive that their previous failings occurred 
in the more distant past, and this greater psycho-
logical distance creates an opportunity to break 
with bad patterns of behavior and form new, 
optimistic plans (Dai, Milkman, and Riis 2015).
Past research in psychology has also shown 
that life shocks (e.g., job changes) that alter a 
person’s surroundings and routines often induce 
changes to plans (Wood, Tam, and Witt 2005). 
In many cases, the timing of the plan change is 
rational, but there is also evidence that people 
update their plans when predictable shocks to 
their circumstances occur, such as when a job 
seeker exhausts unemployment insurance bene-
fits (Ganong and Noel 2015).
III. How Do Plans Deviate from Optimality?
Projection bias (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, 
and Rabin 2003), naïveté about self-control 
problems (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999), and 
overconfidence in one’s ability to remember to 
take actions (Ericson 2011) may all lead people 
to form suboptimal plans.5
As a consequence, people’s plans often fail to 
incorporate adequate mechanisms for shaping 
5 People also form overly optimistic plans, thinking they 
will get more done than they actually do (Buehler, Griffin, 
and Ross 1994). 
future behavior. For example, forgetting to take 
your medication is partly attributable to forget-
fulness, but also partly due to a failure to make 
plans that compensate for forgetfulness. We can 
set alarms to take our pills, but many of us do 
not, contributing to low adherence (Osterberg 
and Blaschke 2005; Baicker, Mullainathan, and 
Schwartzstein 2015). Along these lines, many 
people are unwilling to pay to have a cue that 
serves as an effective reminder for engaging in a 
beneficial behavior, even when the cue leads to 
higher economic payoffs net of its cost (Rogers 
and Milkman 2015). Also, the fact that planning 
prompts can be effective (as discussed above) 
suggests that people do not always form effec-
tive plans (Milkman et al. 2011).
IV. Conclusion
People often develop personal plans to help 
themselves follow through on their intentions. 
Plans can also influence behavior by shaping 
reference points and how decisions are framed. 
However, a complete account of the role of plans 
in economic decision making will require deeper 
knowledge of when and how plans are formed.
There are also important open questions 
regarding how best to measure plans, as eliciting 
a plan may alter it or cause it to be created in 
the first place. Despite this challenge, our under-
standing of the role of plans in driving economic 
outcomes would be greatly enriched by consid-
ering whether, when, where, and how people 
intend to take actions and collecting more data 
on these questions.
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